1 INTRODUCTION
How do people use digital tools to buy and sell drugs? Current research on digital drug markets reflects a wide variety of forms in which illicit substances are traded. Much of this literature examines cryptomarkets, which are eBay-like digital spaces operating on the dark web. There, people can buy a variety of drugs, rate purchases and pay with cryptocurrency (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2014, 2015; Barratt & Aldridge, 2020; Martin, 2014, 2019). A smaller strand of literature also focuses on the use of social media applications such as Facebook, Instagram, or Snapchat to access and purchase drugs (Demant & Bakken, 2019; Demant et al., 2019; Moyle et al., 2019). Accessible through smartphones or computers, this research shows that social media has become an established way to acquire and sell drugs. However, these channels for drug trade still coexist with provision through the clear web (Barratt, 2011; Childs, Bull, and Coomber, 2022). All of these forms of drug supply have changed the way people perceive and respond to risk, build trust with others, and manage the online-offline interface (Aldridge & Askew, 2017; Bakken, 2021; Bakken & Demant, 2019; Demant et al., 2019). However, with the exception of sparse references to the role of messaging apps (Bakken et al., 2022; Barratt et al., 2022; Childs, Bull, and Coomber, 2022; Childs et al., 2020; Moyle et al., 2019; Negri et al., 2021), we know only little about a mode of drug provision based on a quite extended and familiar digital tool: encrypted messaging apps. In this paper, we study how drug sellers and buyers use one of the most extended applications of its kind, Telegram.
We argue that drug dealing supported by encrypted messaging apps effectively facilitates drug trade. Telegram is a digital application that can be legally downloaded to smartphones and used on computers. Like other messaging applications (e.g., WhatsApp), people can create a group or community or join an existing one. What makes Telegram different from other messaging apps, and particularly suitable for drug dealing, is that it offers anonymizing features such as identity hiding, auto-delete options, and no-SIM registration, among others. Once users download the app on a smartphone and become members of one group, they can select a drug and contact the seller privately. Drawing on a unique set of in-depth interviews with drug dealers and consumers belonging to four different Telegram groups in Argentina, we contend that Telegram-based drug dealing enhances the experience of drug selling and consumption. By “enhancing the experience,” we mean the perception among sellers and buyers that drug dealing has improved in some important respects compared to face-to-face drug dealing. For example, we show that this mode of drug provision offers a greater variety of substances at the end of the drug chain, makes illegal substances more accessible, and is less exposed to police detection. On the sellers’ side, this form of drug dealing fosters specialization (i.e., the creation of special commercial niches).
To substantiate our claim, we draw on economic sociology literature on partial organizations (Ahrne et al., 2015; Ahrne & Brunsson, 2011) to show that these experiences emerge as a result of a specific form of organizing drug trade. Apart from the mentioned anonymity features, which change risk perception among users, messaging apps such as Telegram allow the creation of communities featuring three important roles: one organizer or administrator, sellers and buyers. Our argument emphasizes the organizational dimension of Telegram communities to explain the emergence of specific attitudes toward drug consumption. What is crucial is that these Telegram communities are created by someone who works as an organizer, who sets the rules of the game, regulates membership, monitors compliance, and sanctions undesirable behavior, but, importantly, does not own the drugs being sold. Therefore, according to Ahrne and Brunsson (2011), Telegram drug communities are partially organized. We show that hosting large numbers of sellers and buyers increases drug availability (including more types of substances), interactions, competition, expansion to new geographies and lower prices. While a partial organization can host many participants, in this case drug sellers, encryption technology makes detection unlikely, creates the perception that law enforcement will not happen, and provides effortless access to drugs. We provide evidence of groups trading at least seven prohibited drugs, and have over 6000 members, which far exceeds any typical “offline” drug dealing hotspot in the same city.
We make two contributions to the existing literature. First, by analyzing this phenomenon through the lens of Ahrne and Brunsson (2011) partial organizations, we concur with research calling for a differentiated perspective of illegal drug trading (Coomber, 2015; Eck, 1994; May & Hough, 2004). By theorizing the organization of app-based drug dealing as a partial organization, we make a conceptual contribution to the swiftly growing body of studies on illegal trade on platforms, social media, electronic markets or cryptomarkets. Second, we illuminate a phenomenon that is scarcely known. While most research on internet-based drug dealing deals with cryptomarkets, there is a lack of in-depth studies on Telegram used as platform for drug dealing.
This article is structured as follows. We first explain why Telegram communities devoted drug trade are good examples of partial organizations and explain their main features. After briefly presenting the methods used, we provide empirical data showing the social organization and workings of Telegram-based drug dealing. Finally, we show how the specific organization of app-based marketplaces eases access to drug dealing and enhances the experience of both drug selling and consumption.
